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PLURALISTIC LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION:
PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE UNDER THE KLAXON RULE
RICHARD V. CARPENTERt
The growing acceptance of pluralistic legislative jurisdiction is con-
tinuously evidenced by the flow of decisions from the courts.' The pur-
pose of this article is to examine the latest phases of this development and
to consider its influence on the plaintiff's choice of forum-and conse-
quently on his choice of law-under the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co.2  The Klaaon rule, of course, is that by which the Su-
preme Court extended the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 doctrine to compel a
federal court in a diversity case to apply the same choice of law rule as
would a state court of the forum state. While the Erie rule is hailed for
its contribution to the cause of uniformity of law within a single state
and to the elimination of any substantive advantage in hopping from the
state to the federal forum, the Klaxon decision paradoxically seems to as-
sure maximum advantage to a plaintiff from his discerning choice be-
tween two or more available state forums. The problem has become
more acute because of erosion of traditional principles once established
by Pennoyer v. Neff4 and increasing enactment of state long-arm statutes
f Professor of Law, Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, on leave 1965-66 as Visit-
ing Professor at Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, Calif.
1. The writer discussed this trend in tort cases as of 1961. See Carpenter, Con-
flicts: Concurrent Legislative Jurisdiction in Determining Tort Liability, 45 MARQ. L.
Rnv. 1 (1961).
2. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The case involved a diversity suit in a federal court sit-
ting in Delaware for royalties payable under a contract made and to be performed in
New York. After entry of judgment for the plaintiff the plaintiff moved for amend-
ment of the judgment to include interest from the date of the suit to the date of the judg-
ment as required by New York law. The Supreme Court held that the choice of law
governing the inclusion of interest must be subject to the law of the state in which the
federal court was sitting, viz., Delaware. The federal court could not make its own
independent choice of law 'between conflicting rules of two or more states but must abide
by the law of conflicts of the forum state.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This was a diversity negligence action brought in a New
York district court for damages suffered by the plaintiff while walking on the defend-
ant's right of way in Pennsylvania. The lower courts allowed the plaintiff to recover
by applying a rule of federal common law. The Supreme Court reversed, explicitly
overruling the century-old doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and
the more recent case of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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for out-of-state service of process in personal civil actions.5 These fac-
tors have resulted in the expansion of choices available to the plaintiff.
The developing concept of pluralistic legislative jurisdiction has been
illustrated most recently in the field of torts by a series of airline cases
from New York while in contracts it is exemplified by Clay v. Sun Its.
Office, Ltd.6 These decisions will be examined in some detail.
I. THE AIRLINE CASES
In August 1958 a Northeast Airlines plane departed from La-
Guardia Airport in New York on a flight to Nantucket Island in Mas-
sachusetts. Approaching its destination it crashed and burned at Nan-
tucket, killing all on board. Among the many who died in the catastrophe
were the following passengers: Kilberg, Pearson, and Dean-all resi-
dents of the state of New York. All had purchased their flight tickets
at LaGuardia Airport before boarding the ill-fated plane. Within the
appropriate time period after the accident, the respective personal repre-
sentatives of the individual deceased passengers brought suit in the New
York court against Northeast Airlines, a Massachusetts corporation. The
cases presented some interesting conflict of laws questions. The Mas-
sachusetts death statute, which governed the legal consequences of the
disaster so far as Massachusetts was concerned, limited the recovery for
the death of each victim to a maximum of $15,000; contrariwise the
New York constitution explicitly prohibited any statutory limitation on
damages for injuries resulting in death. Secondarily, a New York
statute prescribed that pre-judgment interest from the date of filing suit
to the date of entry of judgment should be included in the amount of
judgment, while Massachusetts made no such provision in its law and
its practice was contrary.
A. The Kilberg Case'
In addition to a count under the Massachusetts death statute the
Kilberg complaint included a count in contract on the theory that the air-
line had breached its contract for safe carriage of the passenger to his
destination. The contract count seemingly provided an excellent oppor-
tunity on traditional terms for the court to avoid the Massachusetts
limitation of damages, since the ticket had been purchased and the con-
tract made in New York and a large part of the performance was in that
5. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (1955) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RUEs §
302 (1962).
6. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
7. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 526, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679
(1960), aff'd 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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state. New York reasonably could have been regarded as the "center of
gravity" of the contract by virtue of its having the most significant con-
tacts. The New York trial court, indeed, upheld the contract count by
denying a motion to dismiss as a matter of law. The appellate division,
however, reversed and ordered the granting of the motion for dismissal
of the contract count, choosing to follow earlier New York precedents
which had rejected the contract theory for recovery of damages from car-
riers in similar situations.' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the appellate division on this point and unanimously rejected the contract
theory as a basis for suit.'
Judge Desmond, writing for the majority of four out of seven
judges, went on to observe in well-deliberated dicta that the court's deci-
sion did not mean that the plaintiff would be limited to a $15,000 re-
covery for the wrongful death."0 Although the suit was under the Mas-
sachusetts death statute the New York court did not regard itself as
bound by the built-in limitation of that statute in view of the strong pub-
lic policy against any statutory limitation on the amount of damages for
injuries resulting in death. Judge Desmond thought the court had
found a way of attaining this result "without doing violence to the ac-
cepted pattern of conflict of law rules." The way was to characterize
the question of damages as one of "procedure' rather than "substance!'
and, consequently, as subject to the law of the forum rather than of the
place of injury by tradition. Two judges dissented from this part of the
majority opinion, including Judge Froessel of whom we shall speak later,
while a third, Judge Fuld, merely disassociated himself on the ground it
was dictum not required for decision of the narrow issue presented by
the appeal-the propriety of the dismissal of the contract count.
Shortly after the court of appeal's decision in Kilberg, the New York
court was presented with a somewhat analogous conflict of laws question
in the case of Davenport v. Webb." This was a New York action for
damages resulting from a wrongful death occurring in Maryland. The
issue was whether the New York court should include in the amount of
recoverable damages an item for pre-judgment interest for the period
between the filing of suit and the entry of judgment. As was noted ear-
lier, such interest was prescribed by New York statute but was not allow-
able by the law of Maryland. The New York trial court included such
pre-judgment interest on the authority of the New York Court of Ap-
8. 10 App. Div. 2d 526, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960).
9. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
10. Id. at 39-42, 172 N.E.2d at 527-29.
11. 11 N.Y2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962).
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peals' dicta in its Kilberg opinion. On appeal the appellate division re-
versed the trial court on this point and struck out the item of pre-judgment
interest. It distinguished the Kilberg case in two respects. It held first
that the New York legislature had not indicated an intention to apply the
pre-judgment interest statute to out-of-state injuries and second that in
any case the New York statutory rule as to interest did not indicate so
strong a state public policy as did the constitutional prohibition involved
in the Kilberg case. In any event a contrary decision by the New York
court might have posed a serious question of due process-at least under
the better view that the right to interest goes to the substance of a plain-
tiff's claim and is not merely procedural. The official reports of the case
reveal no contacts which might have supported any assertion by New
York of legislative jurisdiction to impose extra liability on the non-resi-
dent defendant for the Maryland tort. If the defendant had been an
interstate carrier transporting passenger victims whom he had picked up
in New York, the minimal contract requirement would very likely have
been satisfied. As it was, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
appellate division.
The court of appeal's rationale in the Davenport decision disclosed
sharp discrepancies with Judge Desmond's reasoning in his Kilberg
opinion. Desmond had sought to justify the Kilberg rule with the simple
dichotomy between "substance" and "procedure," holding that the meas-
ure of damages is procedural and hence governed by the law of the forum.
Judge Dye, writing for the court in the later case, said:
The overwhelming weight of authority, recognizing that "the
question of the proper measure of damages is inseparably con-
nected with the right of action," has long held that the measure
of damages for a tort is to be treated as a matter of substance,
governed by the law of the place where the wrong occurred.
This has been particularly true in the area of wrongful death
actions. Such actions did not exist at common law; they are
creatures of statute. Therefore, as we said on another occasion,
"Right and remedy coalesced" and are "united."12
The Court nevertheless continued to adhere to the result indicated by
the Kilberg dicta, justifying it merely as an enforcement of New York's
strong public policy which did not extend to the question of pre-judgment
interest. 8
12. Id. at 393, 183 N.E.2d at 903.
13. Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 904.
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Judge Desmond, author of the Kilberg opinion, concurred in the
Davenport decision with curious ambivalence:
I concur in the result only, since much of the discussion in the
majority opinion is inconsistent with our stated grounds for
decision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines . . . The result here
is correct, however, since there is no New York public policy or
other bar to our following Maryland's law as to interest on a
recovery for a wrongful death in Maryland.14
If the measure of damages could properly be characterized as a procedural
matter, which was the expressed basis for the Kilberg rule, then tradition
would appear to dictate that the law of the forum should control. Judge
Desmond, while refusing to abandon his "procedure" rationale, never-
theless went along with the seemingly inconsistent "policy" theory in
order to concur with the majority in the Davenport decision which applied
the law of the place of injury. Also, oddly enough, Judge Froessel, who
had dissented from the Kilberg dicta, nevertheless relied upon it to sup-
port his dissent from the Davenport decision, possibly in deference to the
principle of stare decisis. Certainly his point appears well taken. The
Davenport decision seems logically incompatible with the Kilberg ra-
tionale. On the other hand the two decisions together make clear that
the New York Court of Appeals has rejected the rationale of its Kilberg
rule but has reaffirmed its conclusion on the alternative basis of strong
public policy.
14. Id. at 395, 183 N.E.2d at 905.
15. The groping rationalization of the Kilberg rule by the New York court is remi-
niscent of the false starts of the California Supreme Court in its rationale of the revo-
lutionary decision in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
Here, it will be recalled, the California court permitted a plaintiff to recover for per-
sonal injuries against an estate by applying the law of the forum rather than that of
the place of injury to the question of whether such a claim survives the death of the
tort-feasor. In his original opinion Judge Traynor, like Judge Desmond in the Kilberg
case, characterized the question as one of procedure and hence applied the law of Cali-
fornia, the forum. After his opinion had been widely commended for its result but criti-
cized for its rationale, Judge Traynor six years later offered the following candid critique
of his own opinion: "Although the opinion in the case is my own, I do not regard it as
ideally articulated, developed as it had to be against the brooding background of a petri-
fied forest. Yet I would make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational
result it was less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of
choice of law." Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEXAs L. RPv. 655,
670, n.35 (1959).
At the same time Traynor rationalized his decision anew, this time weighing policies
and the respective claims and interests of the parties and jurisdictions involved. As a
matter of fact the New York court has gone much further in its Kilberg decision than
did the California court in Grant v. McAuliffe. In that case Arizona's sole contact with
the event was the fortuity that the accident happened to occur within its territory. In
Kilberg Massachusetts had an additional contact in that the defendant was a Massachu-
setts corporation regularly doing a large part of its business there. Moreover, Grant in-
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B. The Pearson Case"
Following the Kilberg decision the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York tried the Pearson case under its diver-
sity jurisdiction. Deeming itself bound by the Kilberg dictum the trial
court entered judgment under the Massachusetts statute without regard
for the $15,000 limitation on damages prescribed by that statute.1 7  Up-
on appeal a panel of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded on the constitutional ground that enforcement of the rem-
edy under the Massachusetts death statute without regard for the limita-
tion built into the statute, constituted violation of full faith and credit."
Judge Kaufman dissented. Upon motion by the plaintiff-appellee a re-
hearing was ordered before the whole court en banc in view of the great
significance of the issue-namely, the constitutional power of the states
to develop conflict of law doctrine.
On the rehearing the whole court overruled the panel decision by a
six to three vote, and affirmed the trial court."9 Judge Kaufman now
wrote the majority opinion. Referring to the panel decision he said:
. . . the inference seemed inescapable that, in effect, the panel
majority had exalted the le% loci delictus to constitutional status
with the consequence that New York was barred from applying
the whole or any part of its wrongful death policy to the events
occurring in Nantucket. If this is indeed the rationale of the
panel's opinion, then it is the first decision to "freeze" into con-
stitutional mandate a choice-of-law rule derived from what may
be described as the Ice Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence-
at a time when that jurisprudence is in an advanced stage of
thaw. A majority of the Court rejects this rationale."0
Judge Friendly's dissent is practically required reading for a com-
plete understanding of the problem involved in the Pearson dispute.
Friendly is clearly prepared to recognize that more than one state may
often have concurrent-or pluralistic-legislative jurisdiction over the
volved a common-law type of action where the courts have traditionally played a crea-
tive, law-making role, whereas Kilberg involved a death action unknown at common law,
for which statutory prescription has ordinarily been deemed essential.
16. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17. The trial court also included in damages an item for pre-judgment interest in
accordance with New York law. Subsequently the New York court in Davenport v.
Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902 (1962), ruled that New York had no overriding
public policy, with respect to pre-judgment interest. This, as a matter of course, elimi-
nated the issue from consideration by the United States court of appeals upon the appeal.
18. 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
20. Id. at 557.
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same set of operative facts. Thus under the Kilberg-Pearson. facts he
would presumably concede that New York had sufficient contacts to jus-
tify its extension of its death statute to the Massachusetts disaster. The
point was that neither the New York legislature nor the New York court
made any pretense of invoking the New York statute. The court ex-
plicitly purported to be enforcing the Massachusetts statute but in its
own free-wheeling fashion, without regard to the built-in limitation which
was an integral part of that statute. Judge Friendly dissented:
[I] t does not follow that when New York looks to a statute of a
sister state as the source of a claim enforceable in its courts,
the Constitution allows it to decline, in the Supreme Court's
words, "to give full faith and credit to all those substantial pro-
visions of the statute which inhered in the cause of action or
which name conditions on which the right to sue depends."'"
Judge Friendly's argument may seem to have some merit in a wrong-
ful death action since traditionally such actions were outside the purview
of common law and have been regarded as based only on statutory enact-
ments. It is suggested however that this rests on too rigid a concept of
common law. The genius of common law has rested in its creative vi-
tality and ability to grow and develop as courts acquire new knowledge
and insights and are faced with new circumstances and needs. Thus,
under the Kilberg-Pearson facts a New York court was called upon to
adjudicate a claim for damages arising from a death occurring in Mas-
sachusetts. In point of fact it applied the ready-made law neither of
Massachusetts, which would have limited recovery to $15,000, nor of
New York, which simply did not apply to the situation. Instead, by its
own common-law vitality it created its own remedy by interweaving
elements of the Massachusetts statute which granted a cause of action
and of the New York constitution which prohibited any statutory limita-
tion on the amount of recovery.22 The New York court's approach is
rather similar to that taken in some recent dram shop cases where the
sale of liquor and the subsequent tort injury occurred in different states.
In such instances a few courts have resorted to common-law theory to
permit recovery where such recovery would not lie under the statutory
provisions, taken alone, of either of the individual states involved.22
21. Id. at 565.
22. Id. at 560, 561.
23. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied 362 U.S. 903 (1960) ; Osborn v. Borchetta, 20 Conn. Supp. 163, 129 A.2d 238
(Super. Ct. 1956). See Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) ;
Carpenter, supra note 1 at 16-18; and Carpenter, Recent CaSes of Interest, 45 CHi. BAR
REcoRD 67, 68 (1963). The courts' resort to common-law theory to overcome the in-
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C. The Dean Case (Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.24)
Gore, a resident of the District of Columbia but the executor of
Dean's New York estate, brought an action for Dean's death in the New
York state court from which it was removed to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. There, on authority of
the Kilberg rule, the plaintiff moved to strike the affirmative defense
based on the Massachusetts statutory limitation on damages. In this in-
stance, surprisingly, the district court denied the motion and allowed the
affirmative defense to stand. It distinguished the case from the Kilberg-
Pearson situation on the sole ground that none of the deceased's next of
kin (who were beneficiaries of the suit) were residents of New York at
the time the suit was brought although three out of five had been resi-
dents at the time of the accident. In fact two were continuously residents
of California and the other three moved from New York to Maryland
some time after the accident but before suit was filed. One wonders
how the court would have handled the problem had the three continued
to reside in New York until entry of judgment. Would it have applied
the limitation with respect to two-fifths of the recovery and applied New
York policy of full compensation with respect to the three-fifths attribut-
able to the New York kin? Would it have enjoined the executor in mak-
ing distribution of proceeds to give only $6,000 (two-fifths of the limited
maximum) to the two California children and to distribute the full re-
mainder (three-fifths of full compensation which the complaint alleged
to be $1,750,000) among the widow and two children who continued to
reside in New York? Such procedure would hardly commend itself to
our common sense but it would seem the logical outcome of the court's
principle of discrimination on the basis of residence of the next of kin.
adequacy of statutory remedies may indicate a tendency away from the judicial attitude
deplored by Justice Stone when he wrote:
[T]he common law courts have given little recognition to statutes as starting
points for judicial lawmaking comparable to judicial decisions. They have
long recognized the supremacy of statutes over judge-made law, but it has
been the supremacy of a command to be obeyed according to its letter, to be
treated as otherwise of little consequence. The fact that the command involves
recognition of a policy by the supreme law making body has seldom been re-
garded by the courts as significant, either as social datum or as a point of de-
parture for the process of judicial reasoning by which the common law has been
expanded . . . I can find in the history and principles of the common law no
adequate reason for our failure to treat a statute much more as we treat a
judicial precedent, as both a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise
for legal reasoning.
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE CoMroN LAw
120, 131-32 (1937).
24. 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). [Throughout the remainder of this article
Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. will be referred to as the Dean case.]
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The federal district court purported to apply the same rule which it
believed the New York court would have chosen had it been deciding the
case, but it found little support for its belief in the reported opinions of
the New York courts on which it relied. The original Kilberg rationale,
as we have seen, -went on the theory that the question of damages was
procedural and hence subject to forum law, which would scarcely suggest
any discrimination based on the residence or non-residence of the plain-
tiffs or beneficiaries. Furthermore, in discussing the Kilberg decision in
a later opinion the New York Court of Appeals said it had been based
on the "interest of New York in providing its residents or users of trans-
portation facilities there originating with full compensation for wrongful
death" (emphasis added).25 Still, the court in the Dean case based its
argument largely on the improbable conjecture that New York's principal
interest was to secure full compensation for its own domiciliaries so they
would not become public charges. Possibly this may have figured in the
state's public policy but its emphasis seems almost frivolous in the case of
a decedent such as Dean, who was apparently a man of means. So also
may victims Kilberg and Pearson have been men of means. The policy
favoring full compensation was not contingent on the need of the next of
kin but on the amount of their loss. Even if we assumed that New
York's concern was limited to its own domiciliaries this would seem to
embrace its domiciliaries who died in the accident. Although technically
the proceeds of the suit would not be included in the deceased's estate for
tax and administrative purposes, any passenger boarding a plane in New
York would certainly regard himself as benefitted materially and in peace
of mind if he knew that New York's liberal policy of full compensation
would protect his family in case of accident. Dean, a New Yorker him-
self, might well have objected to his state's arbitrary and unjust discrim-
ination against his family on the ground of their non-residence. It
would constitute discrimination against himself as well as against his
next of kin.
In any event such discrimination against the surviving next of kin
on the sole ground of their non-residence seems to raise a substantial con-
stitutional question under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."8 The clause of the California Workmen's Compensation
statute involved in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Commn'ni? was
by its terms restricted to residents of the state who entered contracts of
25. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 480, 191 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1963).
26. Currie & Schreter, Uwowstitutional Discrimination in the Coitflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1960).
27. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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hire within the state and suffered injuries in the course of employment
outside the state. Nevertheless the United States Supreme Court applied
the law to a non-resident alien migrant on the authority of California de-
cisions. California courts had extended the statute to non-residents as
well as residents on the ground that otherwise the entire statute would be
invalid because it violated the privileges and immunities clause of article
four of the United States Constitution." Today, perhaps, the privileges
and immunities clause would be a weak reed on which to rely" but the
same argument of unjust discrimination could be made under the cur-
rently more viable equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
It is true that some state courts have departed from the California ap-
proach and upheld a state's privilege to discriminate against non-residents
in dispensing benefits under its workmen's compensation laws.3' Such
discrimination can be defended more easily in the case of workmen's com-
pensation than in the case of civil remedies for tort. In the former case
the state is dispensing insurance funds set up by state mandate and subject
to its control and regulation. In such funds the state has an interest
very nearly proprietary in nature. The Kilberg and Dean cases, on the
other hand, are in the nature of civil tort actions between private indi-
viduals and the airline company, in the outcome of which New York can
in no sense be said to have a proprietary interest. In both cases the opera-
tive facts were identical except for the domicile of the deceased's next of
kin. Even this distinction did not exist until after the cause of action
had arisen. It seems out of character for a federal court to make such
an invidious distinction between residents of New York and those of a
sister state when the New York court itself has given no indication that
it would do so. Unfortunately the district court's dismissal of the mo-
tion in the Dean case seems to have ended the matter. No appeal or re-
argument has been reported.
It is interesting to speculate what the New York Court of Appeals
might have done had a Pennsylvanian and a Massachusetts resident also
been on board the ill-fated plane with Kilberg and died in Nantucket.
Let us assume both had purchased their tickets and enplaned at LaGuardia
along with Kilberg, Pearson, and Dean. Pennsylvania has a wrongful
death statute providing for compensatory damages without arbitrary limit
although as yet Pennsylvania has not indicated that it would follow
28. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 36-44, 192 Pac.
1021, 1026-27 (1920), writ dismissed without decision on inerits, 255 U.S. 445 (1920).
29. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
30. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount
Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
31. 147 A.L.R. 925 (1943); 12 A.L.R. 1207 (1921).
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Kilberg in superimposing its full compensation policy on a claim arising
in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts law, of course, we have already
discussed. Would the New York court try to distinguish between the
claims based on the death of a New York resident in Massachusetts and
the deaths of the Pennsylvanian and the Massachusetts man, respectively,
where all other factors save residence of the victim were identical? Un-
like ancient Rome the Anglo-Saxon and common-law traditions do not
recognize one law for the Romans and another for the Jews. Does it not
seem repugnant to our sense of equal protection of the law to discrimi-
nate against a wrongful death claim solely because of the residence of the
deceased? New York residence, taken alone, would not likely be upheld
as sufficient minimal contact to justify New York's claim to legislative
jurisdiction. For example, if Kilberg had purchased his ticket and en-
planed at Boston instead of LaGuardia and thereafter crashed to his death
in Nantucket, any attempt of the New York court to increase the airline's
liability by applying the Kilberg rule would seem to violate our historical
concept of due process of law." By the same reasoning, since the New
York court has established the Kilberg rule in the case of a New York
resident where it has sufficient other minimal contacts to support its as-
sertion of legislative jurisdiction, can it exclude from the benefits of the
rule an identical claim founded on the death of a non-resident? If it did
limit the Kilberg rule to New York residents, would it then look to the
domicile of the non-resident to determine the rule of damages to be ap-
plied? Suppose the Pennsylvania court or legislature had itself estab-
lished a policy or rule of law identical with New York's policy invoked
in Kilberg, would the New York court take this into consideration and al-
low full compensation on the Pennsylvanian's claim ? Murky as have
become the rules and principles to guide courts in their choice of law the
difficulties would be multiplied many times if we began to regard the
domicile of each victim or claimant as the ultimate determinant of the
right to recover or the measure of damages.
II. CLAY V. SUN INS. OFFICE, LTD. 4
This litigation extended from 1957 to May 1964. It involved a
claim under a so-called personal property floater policy providing for
world-wide coverage against all risks of loss or damage to the property
32. A federal district court in Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 906
(S.D.N.Y., 1964), predictably held that New York policy against limitation of damages
would not control a claim involving the death of a non-resident of New York in the
crash of a plane in flight between Washington and Norfolk, Virginia.
33. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did establish such a policy in Griffith v.
United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
34. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
487
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
covered. The insured was a resident of Illinois and took out the policy
in that state with a British insurance company licensed to do business in
Illinois, Florida, and elsewhere. The insured paid a single premium for
the three-year term of the policy. So far as appears in the case report all
of the insured's property covered by the policy at the time of issuance
was located in Illinois. The policy contained a so-called "suit-clause"
which forbade any suit thereon unless it was instituted within twelve
months after discovery of the loss. This clause was valid under Illinois
law but conflicted with a Florida statute which declared all such contract
stipulations for time limitation to be illegal and void. Three months after
taking the policy the insured moved to Florida where he established his
residence. There his estranged wife deliberately took or damaged some
of his clothes and household effects. He promptly notified the insurance
company which denied liability on the ground that the policy did not
cover malicious damage by his wife. More than two years later the in-
sured initiated suit on his claim in a federal district court in Florida and
recovered judgment for $6,800. The trial court rejected the insurance
company's defense based on the "suit-clause" of the policy. The court of
appeals, voting two to one, reversed and remanded for entry of judgment
in favor of the insurance company. 3 While expressing uncertainty as
to whether the Florida court would apply the Florida statute to an Illinois
contract under the circumstances of the case, the court of appeals held
that in any event any attempt by Florida to do so would be a denial of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment on the ground that the court of appeals was premature in deciding
the constitutional question without first determining the threshold ques-
tion of whether Florida purported to apply its statute to the Illinois con-
ract.86 Two justices, Black and Douglas, dissented, contending first that
the literal language of the Florida statute purporting to embrace "all con-
tracts" was clearly intended to cover the Illinois contract and second that
such application did not violate full faith and credit or due process.
Upon remand the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the
threshold question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court in ac-
cordance with Florida practice. The Florida court gave the following
curious answer:
Obviously . . . the Legislature of this state could not conceiv-
ably have any interest in a contract executed in another state by
35. 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
36. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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residents of other states, involving property in another state;
and we agree with appellant that "Imputing any such intention
to the Florida legislature would be an absurdity." But a statute
must, of course, be read in its entirety; and we think it is equally
clear, from the last sentence thereof, . . . that the Legislature
intended the Act to apply to "any contract whatever"-foreign
or domestic-when Florida's contact therewith, existing at the
time of its execution or occurring thereafter, is sufficient to
give a court of this state jurisdiction of a suit thereon."7
Upon return of the case to it, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
commented on the "novel doctrine" that "the ability to serve the insur-
ance company with process is the Florida test for determining whether
the law of the forum will be applied in ascertaining the enforceability of
policy clauses which are valid where the contract is made." The court
then continued kindly:
Rather than attribute to the Florida court a literal meaning to
the language it used, we think it intended to do no more than to
declare that if the State of Florida had such significant contacts
with the factual phases of the litigation as to give it a para-
mount interest in the control of the governing legal rules, then
its invalidating statute would be applied. If the surmise which
we have made, and we must make one, as to the meaning of the
Florida court's statement of Florida law is a correct one, then it
must be apparent that the court was persuaded of the existence
of the required significant contacts in this case."
The court of appeals nevertheless remained unconvinced that Florida
had sufficient contacts to deprive the insurer of its defenses under the
"suit-clause." It reaffirmed the conclusion it had reached in its earlier
decision of the case, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and re-
manded to the district court for entry of judgment for the insurance
company. None of the three judges participating in this decision had
been among those who had participated in the earlier decision which
they reaffirmed.
Again on certiorari to the Supreme Court that Court unanimously
reversed the court of appeals,"D holding in the language of Justice Doug-
las that "Florida has ample contacts with the present transaction and the
parties to satisfy any conceivable requirement of full faith and credit or
37. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1961).
38. 319 F.2d 505, 510 (1963).
39. 377 U.S. 179, (1964).
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of due process." The Supreme Court thus upheld the initial judgment
entered by the trial court in favor of the insured claimant. We are left
wondering whether the Supreme Court decision in effect approves the
Florida court's opinion extending application of the Florida act "to any
contract whatever-foreign or domestic-when Florida's contact there-
with, existing at the time of its execution or occurring thereafter, is suf-
ficient to give a court of this state jurisdiction of a suit thereon."4
If this interpretation is correct the Clay decision represents the ex-
treme to which the Supreme Court has thus far gone under the Klaxon
rule in recognizing and establishing the doctrine of pluralistic legislative
jurisdiction based on the barest minimal contact. Watson v. Employers
Liability Assur. Corp.,41 cited in the Clay opinion, dealt with a product li-
ability insurance policy and in particular a clause, binding in the state
where made, which prohibited direct action against the insurer until final
determination of the obligation of the insured. The Supreme Court per-
mitted Louisiana to nullify the direct action clause, but there it was a tort
victim who sued and not a party to the contract, and the clause nullified
was one in effect devised by the insurer and the insured to hinder and
obstruct the tort victim's remedy. Thus Louisiana's action seems clearly
less cavalier than Florida's intervention for the plaintiff in the Clay case
to nullify the effect of the plaintiff's own free and voluntary contract,
legal and binding when and where made.
III. THE IMPACT OF PLURALISTIC LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
ON KLAXON
A. Legal Background of Klaxon Rule
At the outset of this article attention was directed to the paradox be-
tween the Erie rule and its Klaxon offspring-the former designed to
promote uniformity of law within a single state and the latter so con-
ducive to diversity among the fifty states. Justice Brandeis based the
Erie decision on the currently quaint theory that the Federal government
is strictly limited on the grant of powers under the Constitution. Thus
he stated:
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature
or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of
40. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1961).
41. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
490
PLURALISTIC JURISDICTION
torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power upon the federal courts."
It is curious that the Supreme Court thus based its Erie decision on a
theory of limited powers at the very time the same Court was enormously
expanding the recognized powers of Congress by enlarging the constitu-
tional concept of interstate commerce. 3 Nevertheless Justice Brandeis'
argument has residual validity even today. The power of the federal
courts to make law can scarcely be deemed to be co-extensive with the
legislative power of Congress. The commerce power was specifically
granted under article one of the Constitution to the legislative branch of
the government and not to the courts. The failure of Congress to enact
laws providing uniform regulation of commercial paper' or tort liability
of interstate railways" or franchise monopolies serving stations of inter-
state railways " may be regarded as deliberate choices by Congress to ab-
stain; and the federal courts cannot properly defeat this choice by sub-
stituting their own rules of common law. Traditionally the dormancy
of the powers of Congress in these areas would not enlarge the powers
of the federal courts but rather would confirm the power of the states to
occupy the field within their respective domains. 7 These arguments are
particularly cogent when a federal court seeks to make law under an as-
sertion of jurisdiction based solely on the diversity of citizenship of the
parties before it without any claim that it is deciding a federal issue
uniquely within its own province where its decision will be paramount to
state law and binding upon state courts. The Erie rule was directed at
these diversity cases and its dominant policy was to eliminate variances in
the substantive law applied to a given set of facts by the state courts on
one side of courthouse square and by the federal courts on the other side.
Something seemed amiss under the former rule of Swift v. Tysoe s when
the outcome of a law suit was made to depend simply on whether it was
triable only in a state court or could also be tried in a federal court be-
42. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Brandeis refused to base his overruling of Swift v.
Tyson on the ground that Swift depended upon an improper construction of the Rules
and Decisions Act of Congress. The original misconstruction of the act, if such it was,
could certainly be deemed ratified after lapse of nearly a century during which Congress
abided by the interpretation without amending or clarifying the act.
43. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
44. An interstate bill of exchange was the subject of the suit in Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
45. Such tort liability was involved in the Erie case. See note 3 supra.
46. Such a monopoly was the subject of the suit in Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
47. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
48. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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cause it met technical diversity requirements which had no substantive
relevance to the cause of action.
On the other hand when the conflict in substantive rules of law is
between two or more interested states rather than between the state and
federal jurisdictions, we might reasonably regard the issue as a matter
of unique federal concern. Here the federal courts would seem natural
arbiters of the competing claims of the states involved. We do concede,
nevertheless, that the federal courts have been loath to assume the role
of such an arbiter. Even twenty years before Erie the Supreme Court in
Union Trust Co. v. Grosmanw 9 held that a federal court sitting in Texas
must enforce Texas local policy in dismissing an action on a Texas mar-
ried woman's contract even though the woman had made the contract in
and for performance in Illinois under whose law the contract was per-
fectly good. Three years after Erie the Supreme Court handed down its
Klaxon decision "° and its even more controversial ruling in Griffin v.
McCoach.5'
The Griffin case involved some New Yorkers who organized an oil
syndicate which depended largely on the know-how of a Texas oil pro-
moter. To protect their investment and ultimately to recoup their losses
the New Yorkers caused the promoter while in New York to take out a
life insurance policy with a New Jersey insurance company naming the
New Yorkers as beneficiaries. The New Yorkers paid or advanced the
money for the payment of all premiums on the policy. Nevertheless on
the insured's death his Texas widow filed claim against the insurance
company in Texas for the whole proceeds of the policy on the ground
that by Texas law the New Yorkers would have no insurable interest in
the promoter's life. The insurance company interpleaded the New
Yorkers. In this interpleader action the federal court stood in a position
distinct from any Texas court for at that time no Texas state court could
have obtained personal jurisdiction over the New Yorkers. By its long-
arm interpleader jurisdiction the federal court in effect shanghaied the
New Yorkers into Texas jurisdiction and stripped them of their rights
gained under the New York law on the theory that it had no other
alternative but to apply Texas law. Here both New York and Texas
may be regarded as having independent or pluralistic jurisdiction to im-
pose on the insurance transaction certain legal consequences without, in
either case, violating constitutional due process or full faith and credit.
Texas construed its law as controlling even though its only connection
49. 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
50. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
51. 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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(apart from being the forum) was a single contact: the insured's resi-
dence. New York, of course, with far more reason would have con-
strued its law as governing the consequences of the transaction.
B. Effect of Expanding Jurisdiction in Personam
The problem has been aggravated, as already indicated, by the cur-
rent retreat from the old formalism of Pennoyer v. Neff 2 and its narrow
restrictions on in personam jurisdiction exercisable by state courts. This
retreat can be traced through the state non-resident motorist acts which
today generally authorize constructive service of process on non-resident
defendants in causes of action arising from motor accidents within the
state, and in the so-called "long-arm" statutes being enacted by more and
more states, which assert personal jurisdiction over non-residents on the
basis of single acts or other minimal contacts within the state. 3 The
United States Supreme Court has gone far to support these innovations
by its decisions in Hess v. Pawloski24 and McGee v. International Ins.
Co." Also, in 1963, it liberalized rule four of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to extend such innovations of any state to the manner and
place for service of process in any action brought in a federal court sitting
in such state. Again, early in 1964 the Supreme Court put its stamp of
approval on contractual contrivances whereby an interstate seller can
subject his farflung customers to the court jurisdiction of some pre-
selected state." The clear consequence, of course, is to offer a plaintiff
in many cases involving multiple state contacts a far wider choice among
forums available for filing suit. Under facts similar to the Klaxon case
itself the plaintiff today could avoid the results of that decision by bring-
ing his suit in New York where the Delaware defendant had originally
entered into the contract sued upon." For practical purposes a basic key
to the choice of law has become the choice of forum which more and more
has become a matter within the plaintiff's power of election.
C. Prospects for Modification of the Klaxon Rule
Any foreseeable modification of the Supreme Court's extremism in
applying the Klaxon rule would probably have to come, if at all, at the in-
stance of Congress. Congress seemed to open the way to greater flexi-
bility under the Klaxon rule when in 1948 it enacted section 1404(a) of
the Judicial Act which provides:
52. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
53. See note 5 supra for examples of these statutes.
54. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
55. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
56. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 321 (1964).
57. See note 2 supra.
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For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought
(emphasis added).
This provision suggested the possibility that a federal court faced with a
difficult choice of law in a diversity case might escape the Klaxon strait-
jacket "in the interest of justice" by transferring the case to a suitable
forum with a more acceptable rule of law. Thus in the airline cases a
federal court sitting in New York might avoid, if it saw fit, the un-
orthodox New York Kilberg rule by transferring the case to a federal
court sitting in Massachusetts. The Supreme Court destroyed any hope
of this solution by its decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack8 which held that
upon any transfer under section 1404(a) the transferee court would be
compelled to apply the choice of law of the transferor forum and not of
the transferee. Thus such transfer can effect no change in the choice of
law or in the substantive law applicable in the case. The plaintiff will
continue to enjoy any advantage which he may have gained by his original
choice of forum.
In the spring of 1964 the American Law Institute issued a report in
draft form of a Study for the Division of Jurisdiction between State and
Federal Courts. 9 It recommends various changes in the United States
Judicial Code which would affect the operation of the Klaxon rule in a
number of ways. In the first place the recommendations would substan-
tially curtail diversity jurisdiction in the following respects: 1) by pre-
cluding any person from invoking federal jurisdiction, either originally
or on removal, in any district in a state of which he is a citizen, 2) by re-
stricting a corporation's access to federal courts, and 3) by virtually
eliminating a commuter's recourse to the federal courts in matters arising
in a state where he works."0 These changes, of course, will in no way
deter the proliferating pluralism of our jurisdictions. The study con-
tinues to favor the Klaxon choice of law rule and recommends legislation
which would codify the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack"' whenever the
transfer of venue under section 1404(a) is made upon motion of the de-
fendant. 2 The study, however, recommends an interesting exception to
the Van Dusen rule when the transfer of venue is made upon motion of
the plaintiff. In such case the study recommends legislation which would
58. 372 U.S. 964 (1964).
59. ALI STUDY OF THE DivIsioN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDER-AL
COURTs (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964). [Hereinafter cited as 2 ALl.]
60. 2 ALI § 1302, comment at 67-77.
61. 372 U.S. 964 (1964).
62. 2 ALl § 1306(c), comment at 96-97.
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require the transferee forum to apply the choice of law rule of the state
in which it sits. The reporters believe that upon obtaining such a transfer
of venue the plaintiff should not be permitted to preserve any advantage
which he might have obtained by his original choice of forum."
The reporters also, in effect, manifest their disenchantment with
the results reached in Griffin v. McCoach4 by recommending legislation
which would permit the federal court to make its own independent choice
of law in cases where it exercises jurisdiction by reason of long-arm fed-
eral process beyond the reach of the process of the state in which it sits.
Thus, in federal interpleader cases the district court would be permitted
to make its own determination as to which state rule of decision would
be applied.6" The same exception would apply under a recommended new
chapter of the Judicial Code entitled "Multi-Party Multi-State Diversity"
which would provide original jurisdiction and long-arm federal process
in any civil action in which the several defendants who are necessary for
a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process
of any one territorial jurisdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is
a citizen of a state and the other is a citizen or subject of another terri-
torial jurisdiction. 6 In basing these two exceptions on the absence of
personal jurisdiction of the state courts over the parties to the suit the
study uses an approach curiously similar to that of the Florida court in
its declaratory opinion in the Clay case. That court, it will be remem-
bered, purported to invoke Florida law whenever Florida's contact "is
abundantly sufficient to give a court of [Florida] jurisdiction of a suit
thereon."6
7
In a memorandum published in an earlier draft of the American Law
Institute Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Fed-
eral Courts, Professor Cavers enumerates alternatives to the abolition of
Klaxon,8 including a relatively modest and attractive proposition that the
federal courts exercise greater freedom in choice of law decisions in di-
versity cases. Professor Cavers says:
[W] here, as in choice of law, conformity is not dictated by con-
stitutional compulsion, the federal courts should be allowed to
exercise greater freedom. It would certainly be compatible with
63. Id. § 1307(b), comment at 99.
64. 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
65. 2 ALI § 2361 (c), comment at 158.
66. Id. § 2344(c), comment at 147.
67. Sun. Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735, 738 (Fla. 1961).
68. Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon
Problem, in ALI STUDY OF THE DmSION OF JURISDIcTioN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouRTs (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963), 154, 202.
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retention in the states of the power to delimit their own policies
if a federal court on an issue of choice of law were to enjoy
at least as much freedom as a state's intermediate appellate
court. Indeed I believe the federal court should also be free to
re-examine doctrines which, though still unchallenged, no longer
seemed likely to be accepted by the state's supreme court.6"
The court of appeals in its initial decision of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd.,"0 chose to apply Illinois law on a constitutional basis without deter-
mining whether Florida would have applied its own local law. If the
court had decided the same way but, absent Florida authority, purported
to interpret Florida law as not reasonably intended to apply to the trans-
action at bar, conceivably the Supreme Court might have affirmed in the
same spirit as that of Professor Cavers. The Supreme Court's language,
however, discourages us from believing that this would have been the
result. Three justices, Black, Warren, and Douglas, seemed to proceed
on the inarticulate premise that absent an authoritative state ruling to the
contrary, a state may be presumed to intend to apply its local law to inter-
state transactions to outermost constitutional limits."' Justice Frank-
furter, writing for the majority, advocated as he has in other similar
situations that the federal court should suspend decision until it can secure
a state court's determination of any unresolved question of its local law.72
So here again, the Supreme Court has made reasonably clear by its Clay
decisions that it is not of a mind to modify the Klaxon rule even so mod-
estly as Professor Cavers has suggested.
Nevertheless, we know how Congress and the Supreme Court have,
from time to time in piecemeal fashion, limited and made ad hoc excep-
tions to the Erie doctrine itself. Most of these modifications have ap-
plied to situations where the United States government or one of its
agencies was party to the action or where the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is not based solely on diversity of citizenship of the parties. Thus
the Court has held that the availability of equitable defenses on a note
which has been pledged with the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
must be determined by federal common law and not by the local law of
either of the two states involved.73 It also has held that federal law mer-
chant developed under the Swift v. Tyson regime must govern the rights
and duties of the United States government on a treasury check which
69. Id. at 211.
70. 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959).
71. 363 U.S. 207, 215-216 (1960).
72. Id. at 212.
73. D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). But see U.S. v.
Yazell, 334 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964).
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had been negotiated on a forged endorsement' and that federal common
law fashioned in accord with the policy of our national labor laws must
govern all suits for violation of labor contracts under section 301 (a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act."' Congress in turn has provided
that the tort liability of the United States government for the negligent
or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees shall be governed by the
law of the place where any such act or omission occurred" and that the
tort liability of railroads for injuries or death of their employees while
employed in interstate commerce shall be governed by the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act.7 Even in diversity cases the Supreme Court has
held that the Erie doctrine does not extend to the federal right to trial by
jury"' and in prescribing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Court
presumably exempted from Erie all matters covered by the rules."8
In like manner we may possibly see future ad hoc modifications in
the application of the Klaxon and Erie rules in areas of great federal con-
cern or where the need for uniformity looms particularly large. Thus
Judge Friendly has commented on the slowness with which states are
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code and has suggested the feasibility
of a Federal Commercial Code modeled after the Uniform Code. 0 How-
ever, in this particular area things are now moving so rapidly that per-
haps Congressional action will be unnecessary. During the last two
years eighteen additional states have adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code bringing the total number of states which have done so to twenty-
nine. Knowledgeable men think it likely that within five years practi-
cally all the fifty states will have adopted the Code. Even absent a fed-
eral statute the Court of Claims and the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals, respectively, have recently ruled that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code governs the interpretation of federal contracts because it
reflects "the best in modern decision and discussion."8 " If this trend con-
tinues the problem of Erie and Klaxon with respect to commercial paper
may eventually in the ordinary course of events be resolved in favor of
uniformity. In this connection it should also be noted that the Uniform
74. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
75. Textile Works Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958), construed in Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1 (1962).
77. Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
78. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
79. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Meador, State Law and the Federal
Jicdicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rav. 1082, 1103-04 (1963).
80. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Commnon Law, 19 REcORD
oF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 90 (1964).
81. Padbloc Co. v. United States, Wo. 523-57, Ct.C1. April 5, 1963, cited with ap-
proval in Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 33 U.S.L. WEuK 2024 (A.S.C.B.A. July 14, 1964).
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Commercial Code itself contains provisions for determination of the
choice of law in any transaction which bears "a reasonable relation" to
two or more states.8 2
Similarly Professor Prosser has made a strong case in favor of a fed-
eral statute to govern multiple state libels." Attention might also be
directed to a recent United States Supreme Court decision holding that
the judge-made act of state doctrine is a federal and not a state question
of law in a diversity case.8 The complexity of questions raised by the
New York airline cases discussed earlier in this paper point to the desir-
ability of a federal law to regulate and standardize the liability of airlines,
manufacturers, suppliers, and operators for injuries or deaths suffered
on interstate airlines.8 5 It is important to note that such modifications
are more apt to take the form of establishing federal rules of law ex-
tending beyond diversity cases rather than guidelines to assist in the
choice of one state rule of law rather than another. In other words, any
changes are apt to affect the scope of the Erie rule as well as Klaxon. As
Judge Friendly has remarked, "state courts must conform to federal de-
cisions where Congress, acting within powers granted to it, has mani-
fested, be it ever so lightly, an intention to that end.""8  Even in areas
where Congress and the Supreme Court may not see fit to impose federal
law binding upon state courts much can be said in favor of abrogating
the Klaxon rule. Such abrogation would mean that in diversity cases pre-
senting questions of choice of law, a Federal court could exercise its own
independent judgment in choosing and applying one of conflicting plural-
istic rules of law asserted by two or more interested states. The Federal
court would no longer be compelled blindly to apply the law of the state
in which it happened to be sitting.
D. Klaxon"s Relation to Pluralism and Standards in the Choice of Law
Today's pluralism is a far cry from the cherished ideal of uniformity
of decision which once animated American law in theory if not always in
practice. This was the ideal that all forums, regardless of variances in
their domestic laws and regardless of multiple state contacts, would at-
82. UNIFORM C mMERCIAL CODE, § 1-105.
83. Prosser, Interstate Publications, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 959, 995-9 (1953).
84. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-424 (1964). The Su-
preme Court here applied the act of state doctrine to enforce a discretionary Cuban ex-
propriation without compensation which the State Department itself had denounced as a
violation of international law. The court declared that federal and not state law gov-
erned because "the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature." The same might
be said of choice of law questions involving the competing interests and conflicting poli-
cies of two or more states.
85. Friendly, supra note 80, at 88, 89.
86. Id. at 82.
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tach the same legal consequences to a given set of operative facts. Tradi-
tional American theory sought to prescribe unique contacts in each case
which would give one territory rather than another the exclusive jurisdic-
tion to define authoritatively the ultimate legal consequences of the re-
spective operative facts. The rights thus defined by a state found to have
exclusive jurisdiction were said to be "vested" and entitled to recognition
and usually to enforcement by all other states. If no rights were granted
by such state with jurisdiction, then no rights could be granted or en-
forced by any other state. justice Brandeis presents a good example of
this view in his majority opinion in Bradford v. Clapper." There he held
that the full faith and credit clause of the constitution compelled a court
to give effect to the compensation law of the state of principal employ-
ment and to deny the common-law tort remedy under the law of the state
of injury, which also happened to be the forum state. The first state, ac-
cording to Brandeis, had exclusive legislative jurisdiction to define the
jural relations between employer and employee. Remembering that Bran-
deis a few years later authored the opinion in Erie v. Tompkins88 which
bound federal courts in diversity cases to apply the substantive law of the
states in which they sat, it is interesting to find him in Bradford invoking
constitutional compulsion to impose a federal choice of state law upon all
states.
Justice Stone's approach in Bradford v. Clapper,9 on the other
hand, offers a sharp contrast. He concurred in the result of the pre-Erie
case but on the basis of judicial discretion and not of constitutional com-
pulsion. Subsequently Stone wrote court opinions developing the theory
that in workmen's compensation cases with multiple state contacts, each
interested state could properly apply its own remedy in the matter with-
out compulsion to defer to the interest or law of any other state or
states."0 For example, in the Alaska Packers case he said:
In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress
has not prescribed, where the policy of one state statute comes
into conflict with that of another, the necessity of some accom-
modation of the conflicting interests of the two states is still
more apparent. A rigid and literal enforcement of the full
faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the for-
um, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict
87. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
88. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
89. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
90. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) ; Alaska Packers Ass'n v. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts
of the other, but cannot be in its own. Unless by force of that
clause a greater effect is thus to be given to a state statute
abroad than the clause permits it to have at home, it is un-
avoidable that this Court determine for itself the extent to
which the statute of one state may qualify or deny rights as-
serted under the statute of another.9
Justice Stone delivered the foregoing opinion before the Erie and Klaxon
decisions. Hence he reserved to the federal courts and to the United
States Supreme Court the function of determining the extent to which
the law of one state may qualify or override the law of another. Any
rescission of the Klaxon rule would merely revest this function in the
federal courts sitting in any diversity cases. In fulfilling this function
we see no compelling reason why the federal courts would be at any
greater disadvantage than the state courts in working out rational and
coherent principles to guide their actions.
Nevertheless, in defense of the Klaxon rule Professor Cavers has
argued:
Are we to conclude that the disinterested federal forum, if freed
from Klaxon, would be more likely to reach the right solution
(which, moreover, it could impose on both states) ? If conflict
persists under a choice-of-law process that encouraged courts to
examine the policy implications of their decisions, I believe a
more probable explanation would be that most of the chronic
differences would reflect genuine differences in values. More-
over, I doubt that there is any supra-state hierarchy of values
which would justify the federal courts exercising diversity jur-
isdiction in overriding one state's strongly-held values in favor
of another's as long as constitutional limits on state power were
respected. Yet the attack on Klaxon implies the proposition
that the states should, in diversity cases, be ousted of their
authority to identify and delimit their own policies even though
these policies are kept within the bounds set by the Supreme
Court under the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses.9"
In similar vein Professor Currie asserts that opposition to the Ilaxon
rule "assumes that it is possible to develop a rational system of conflict
of laws in the abstract, independently of the construction and interpreta-
91. 294 U.S. 532, 547.
92. Cavers, supra note 68, at 165-66.
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tion placed by the courts of a state upon its laws."93  Elaborating his
position, he continues:
Many familiar conflict-of-laws problems can and should be re-
solved by reference to the governmental policies of the states
concerned, and to the interests of the respective states in the ap-
plication of such policies. Another way of saying this is that
many conflict-of-laws problems can and should be resolved
through construction or interpretation of the laws in question.
The applicability of a statute or common-law rule to a case
having foreign aspects presents a question of construction or
interpretation of the same kind as does the applicability of the
same statute or rule to a marginal domestic situation, or a situa-
tion existing prior to the enactment of the statute. If this is
true, it is clear that a federal court should be bound as firmly
to apply the state court's construction of the law in its applica-
tion to cases having foreign aspects as it is bound to apply the
state court's construction to the law in its application to mar-
ginal domestic situations and pre-existing conditions.9"
The foregoing views are puzzling. The abrogation of the Klaxon
rule need not strip the state courts of their function of construing and
interpreting and even formulating the laws and policies of their respec-
tive states. Absent the Klaxon rule, a federal court would be called upon
merely to choose between the laws and policies of two or more states
with legitimate contacts or interests in a given transaction. The indi-
vidual states would still determine the intended scope of their own laws
and policies and their intended application to transactions having foreign
aspects. If a federal court in a diversity case is called upon to make a
choice of law decision at a time when the courts and legislatures of the
states involved have left uncertain the precise scope of their respective
laws and policies, the federal court would perhaps be called upon at the
threshold of its decision, to define the limits to which it believes the
states would assert their respective laws and policies. But the federal
courts do this much already in operating under both the Erie and the
Klaxon rules.
To illustrate let us go back to the airline cases. If the federal court
had decided the Pearson case before the New York court had decided
Kilberg, it is hardly likely it would have reached the novel and unprece-
93. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 433 (1963).
94. Id. at 434.
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dented result of those two cases. Under the Klaxon rule the federal court
would have no choice but to follow the New York choice of law and there
was no pre-Kilberg authority to show that the New York court would ap-
ply the New York rule of damages to a Massachusetts tort. Similarly,
if the Klaxon rule were put aside the federal court would still be restricted
to a choice between the end result prescribed by the law and policy of New
York (including its choice of law) and that prescribed by the law and
policy of Massachusetts. It is reasonably certain that Massachusetts
would have limited the damages in the airline cases, and prior to Kilberg
there was no precedent to indicate that New York would not deem itself
traditionally bound by the Massachusetts limitation of damages. Under
such circumstances the laws and policies of the two states, taken as a
whole, would not have appeared to conflict and therefore the federal court
would have had no choice to make. It is not proposed that repeal of
the Klaxon rule would empower a federal court to extend the New York
rule of damages to a Massachusetts tort when New York itself would not
do as much.
Of course situations arise where the full intended scope of the laws
and policies of the respective states are uncertain. Here the federal courts
are required to do their own construction and interpretation of state laws,
but this is equally true with or without the Klaxon rule. For example in
Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store,95 a dram shop case in which the
defendant sold liquor in Illinois and his customer injured the plaintiff
in Michigan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found itself bound by
Illinois and Michigan decisions to the effect that the Illinois Dram Shop
Act did not apply to out of state torts and the Michigan statute did not
apply to out of state liquor dealers. Under the circumstances the Court
showed Houdini-like dexterity in escaping both the Erie and the Klaxon
straitjackets by permitting recovery under the alleged common law of
Michigan in the belief that this would not violate the policy of Illinois,
the forum state, since Illinois also imposed criminal penalties for sale of
liquor to intoxicated persons. Here the federal court took the lead in an
enlightened interpretation of Illinois law and policies-a lead which the
Illinois courts were not loathe to follow. In the Colligan case four years
later, the Illinois Appellate Court reached a similar result under presumed
Indiana common law where the defendant had sold liquor in Illinois and
his customer had injured the plaintiff in Indiana." Here in its ap-
parent eagerness to reach the "right result" the court entered judgment
without proof of Indiana common law but on the presumption that In-
95. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
96. 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d (1963).
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diana common law was the same as Illinois common law prior to the
Illinois Dram Shop Act.
The abrogation of the Klaxon rule would not of itself oust states of
their authority to identify and delimit their own policies, as Professors
Cavers and Currie seem to fear. It would merely deprive them of the
final say as to whether their particular policies should prevail over con-
flicting policies of sister states with equal or better claims to legislative
jurisdiction over the respective matters involved. More than a single
state must be involved to make a conflict of laws and policies. The ques-
tion is simply: which state should be the appropriate power to identify
and to select between those laws and policies. Should the answer be with-
in the exclusive power of a state, which may have relatively minor con-
tacts, simply because by chance or plaintiff's adroit choice it happens to
be the forum? An independent nation can, if it be so minded, employ all
its effective power to enforce its particular rules and policies in a given
transaction without regard for the interest or legislative jurisdiction of
another nation with different rules and policies. But is it appropriate
that this same bleak principle of effective power should control the choice
of law among our fraternity (or sorority) of federated states even where
there be diversity of citizenship and a federal court is in a position to
resolve the issue?
There seems little basis for fearing that abolition of the Klaxon rule
would result in a reversion by the federal courts to the mechanistic choice
of law rules prescribed by the original Restatement of 1934 or even to the
more flexible norm of the tentative draft of the Restatement which seeks
to apply the law and policies of the particular state which has the most
significant relationship with a given transaction. After all, it was before
the Klaxon case that Justice Stone and the United States Supreme Court
developed the pluralistic doctrine in workmen's compensation cases that
an injured employee could elect his remedy under the laws of either the
state of employment or the state where the injury occurred. In electing
an administrative remedy under the workmen's compensation laws, the
claimant is of course required to proceed in the forum which has the ma-
chinery to process the remedies he invokes. But in a migratory civil
action a plaintiff should be able to sue in any convenient forum under
alternative counts based on the law and policy of any state having suf-
ficiently significant contacts with the transaction involved. Thus in the
airlines cases both New York and Massachusetts gave alternative rem-
edies to the families of the deceased passengers. Prescinding from the
Klaxon. rule there seems no reason to suppose a judge sitting in a federal
court could not fairly consider New York's jurisdictional claim to pro-
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vide more liberal remedies for the claimants. Philosophy, intelligence,
predilections, and temperament differ from judge to judge according to
the qualities of the individuals involved without regard to whether they
sit on federal or state courts. A federal judge as such can be expected
to differ from a state judge as such principally in his greater detachment
from the parochial self-interests of his local state. This would be a con-
siderable virtue in any judge called upon to choose between the conflicting
policies and interests of two or more states.
Quite apart from the Klaxon rule the federal court might well have
reached the same result in the Pearson case as it did. New York cer-
tainly had substantial and significant contacts with the occurrence-more
than adequate to justify its assertion of legislative jurisdiction in the
matter. New York did no more than to provide remedial damages for
a loss actually suffered. Massachusetts did not deny the real loss suf-
fered by the claimants and it likewise imposed sanctions against the air-
line for its alleged negligence. It differed only in its arbitrary limitation
of the damages it would allow. But suppose New York law also per-
mitted the recovery of punitive damages under the circumstances of the
case. Such punitive damages might be within the rubbery confines of the
Constitution but a federal court free of the Klaxon rule would certainly
have good ground on which to refuse to recognize New York's assertion
of penal jurisdiction while at the same time upholding its jurisdiction to
grant remedial damages for a loss actually suffered.
Suppose further that the airflight had been between Boston and a
point in western Massachusetts and at the end of the flight the plane had
been blown off course and crashed in New York a few feet from the
Massachusetts state line. Under these circumstances the great weight of
the traditional locus delicti rule would presumably assure the constitu-
tionality of applying New York's more liberal measure of damages.
Under the existing state of the law a plaintiff would certainly be well
advised to bring his suit in New York. Nevertheless under new ap-
proaches to choice of law questions which seek a transaction's "center
of gravity," a grouping of contacts, and a weighing and evaluation of
the significance of contacts some judges might be expected to find that
New York's contact to the transaction was one of inconsequential chance
with insufficient significance to justify the application of New York's
more liberal measure of damages. If the defendant were a Massachu-
setts airline which customarily restricted its flights to Massachusetts ter-
ritory this argument would be particularly strong. Apart from the Klaxon
rule we might find a federal judge sitting in a diversity case even within
a New York district, applying Massachusetts' limited measure of dam-
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ages. Of course, if it were clear that even in such a case a Massachusetts
court would apply the law of the place of injury and so also would a New
York court, the federal court could be expected to go along. No question
of choice of law would be presented. This decision to apply the law of
the place of injury would result not from any conservatism on the part
of the federal court or refusal to adopt a functional approach based on
consideration of the legitimate interests and policies of the states involved
but rather from such postures on the part of the state courts involved.
Let us turn now to some contract cases. It was the United States
Supreme Court in pre-Erie and pre-Klaxon days which contributed
mightily to the sound (but not absolute) choice of law principle which
favored the validating law of one state over the invalidating law of an-
other. This is illustrated by two early Supreme Court decisions. One in
1875 involved a bill of exchange drawn and orally accepted in Illinois and
payable in Missouri," and the other in 1891 involved a bill of exchange
drawn and orally accepted in Missouri and payable in Illinois. 8 The
oral acceptance was valid under Illinois law but invalid under the Mis-
souri statute of frauds. In each instance the Court upheld the validity of
the acceptance and enforced payment of the bill. In the earlier case the
Court invoked the mechanical rule that matters bearing upon the execu-
tion, interpretation, and validity of the contract are determined by the
law of the place where the contract was made. In the latter case the
Court took a more functional approach, reciting that the contract was to
be entirely performed in Illinois where the defendants resided and carried
on their business, concluding therefore that these facts indicated the
parties had contracted "with a view to the law of Illinois." Despite the
varying rationales of the two cases they are readily reconciled on the
validating principle favoring the law of any involved state which would
uphold contractual obligations freely assumed in good faith. The same
principle was observed by the Supreme Court in pre-Erie usury cases. 9 It
is also propounded in the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law of
Conflicts:
A prime objective of contract law is to protect the justified ex-
pectations of the parties who naturally expect and intend that
all the contract's provisions should be valid and effective. For
this reason, the courts will be inclined to apply a law which
would uphold the entire contract or a provision thereof in pref-
97. Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875).
98. Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116 (1891).
99. Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
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erence to one under which the contract, or the particular provi-
sion, would be invalid.' 0
Against the foregoing, contrast the decision in Clay v. Sun Ills. Of-
fice, Ltd., where the Supreme Court applied the strict Klcxon rule to re-
verse the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.' It invalidated the explicit
"suit-clause" of the contract, freely entered into by the contracting parties,
by the process of applying the local law of the forum state with minimal
contacts which had not come into existence until after the contract had
been in force for some time. The decision illustrates how Klaxon's doc-
trinaire absolutism can defeat any intelligent choice of law approach by
the federal courts in the face of local parochialism.
Perceptive students of the judicial process realize that courts (in-
cluding some of the best judges) are prone to fashion their judgments to
attain what they believe to be practical or just results under the highly
particularized circumstances of each case.0 2 They may disguise the pro-
cess by juggling alternative rules or principles each of which seems
couched in sufficiently broad language to cover all cases. The two pre-
Erie Supreme Court cases which we have just discussed provide one ex-
ample of this.0 3 Let us see further how this judicial practice might af-
fect a case similar in facts to Union Trust Co. v. Grosman.0t In this pre-
Erie case Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, took a
K4,xon-like approach to invalidate a good Illinois contract made by a
Texas married woman. Under similar facts today a plaintiff could avoid
the sad consequences of that case by bringing his suit in Illinois rather
than in Texas and obtaining jurisdiction of the Texas woman under the
Illinois long-arm statute. The Illinois court would almost certainly up-
hold and enforce the contract under the law of Illinois where the money-
lending bank was doing its business and where the contract was signed
and was to be performed. The Texas policy was desiged to protect
married women from uxorial pressure to pledge their fortunes in the in-
terest of their respective husbands. Such a law represents a minority
100. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAws 33, 34 (Tentative Draft No. 6, April 1960).
The sentence immediately following the passage quoted is as follows: "A law which
will uphold the contract will not be applied in preference to the local law of a state
where a considerable majority of the important contacts are grouped."
101. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
102. This "just-result" test, of course, involves value judgments which scandalize
many legal theoreticians 'because they elude rigid standards for judicial certainty which
such theoreticians perenially hope can reduce decision-making to a computer-like process-
ing of all factors involved. See Carpenter, Valuw Judgments as Norms of Law, 7 3.
LEGAL ED. 163, 176-77 (1954). Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the continued ap-
peal of the Klgaot rule with its relative certainty and built-in bias in favor of the forum.
103. See cases cited notes 96 and 97 supra.
104. 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
PLURALISTIC JURISDICTION
archaic rule stemming from common law but inconsistent with the in-
dependent role and status of modern women. Despite the publicized
image of dominating Texan males, courts outside Texas are not apt to
assume that the proportion of submissive wives requiring protection is
any greater in Texas than in any other state. Consequently one would
normally expect a non-Texas court (including a federal court sitting in
Texas if only it were free of Klaxon shackles) to apply Illinois law to
enforce the contract against the Texas wife. Suppose, however, the evi-
dence in a particular case showed that the wife was unskilled in com-
merce and dominated by her wheeler-dealer spouse, and that the latter
had deliberately brought her to Chicago away from the protective sanc-
tuary of her home state in order to get the advantage of her personal
fortune in some risky venture of his own. Suppose also that the Chicago
money-lender could be charged with notice of these circumstances. Equit-
able elements now enter the scene and a federal court sitting in Illinois,
acting independently of the Klaxon rule, might be expected to give greater
weight than otherwise to the protective domiciliary law of Texas. Texas
law and policy might be justified here but not in a situation where a
knowledgeable wife has acted in cooperation with her husband to mislead
unwary non-Texas creditors.
CONCLUSION
We suspect that many "progressive" state courts which depart from
traditional mechanical choice of law rules in favor of more flexible prin-
ciples and standards are actually moved by mixed impulses including
partiality for the law of their own respective states or solicitude for the
plaintiff or both. For example, the courts of California, Wisconsin, New
Jersey, and New Hampshire have in recent years refused to look to the
traditional lex locus injuriae to determine the question of intra-family
tort liability where the parties were residents of the forum state but the
injuries occurred in other states whose laws precluded intra-family lia-
bility."°5 They followed a new approach of characterizing the intra-
family issue as one of family law subject to the state of domicile rather
than as one of tort subject to the state where the injury occurred, which
has no governmental interest in the intra-family liability of non-residents.
Such approach in every case decided thus far has enabled the courts to
apply the law of their own states and to permit recovery by the plaintiffs.
It remains to be seen what these same courts may do when family mem-
105. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 427, 289 P.2d 218, 223 (Cal. 1955) ; Haums-
child v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Koplick v. C. P.
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958) ; Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86,
193 A.2d 439 (1963).
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bers from a common-law state which denies intra-family liability come
into the respective forum states and sue to recover damages for injuries
suffered within such forum states. Of course, behind the scenes in such
cases there usually lurks an insurance company. It is questionable
whether the courts will be so ready to invoke domiciliary law when that
law is contrary to the law of the forum state where the tort occurred and
would result in denying the plaintiff recovery for real injuries suffered.
Under such circumstances we suspect that some or all of these courts
might see fit to recast their rationale, finding the common-law rule of
the domiciles to be backward and obsolete by modern sociological stand-
ards of the forum states and thus contrary to strong public policy. This
would bring these cases into line with the "local public policy" theory
underlying the New York rule in the airline cases and the Florida rule
in the Clay decision. This theory in turn depends on the unabashed ac-
ceptance of pluralistic legislative jurisdiction which plays down the prin-
ciple of uniformity.
We do not believe, however, that pluralism should lead to the com-
plete abandonment of all efforts toward some degree of uniformity in the
standards and principles acceptable as guidelines in choice of law deci-
sions. In this respect, at least, we seem to be in agreement with most
legal authorities writing on the subject. However, we go further and
surmise that the federal courts could contribute considerably more to the
achievement of some relative uniformity if they abandon the Klaxon rule
when called upon to weigh the conflicting claims and interests of two or
more states. True, the federal courts are divided into eleven circuits
which often disagree, but at least they form a single judicial system. Uni-
formity and not pluralism is their avowed goal and they are subject to the
occasional direction and control of the Supreme Court when it takes cases
on appeal or certiorari. But by adopting and clinging to the Klaxon rule
the federal courts have abdicated their role in the choice of law area. In
such matters it must now be the state courts of the respective state forums
which weigh the diverse interests of the states involved or prescribe their
weighing in the balance. Uniformity becomes a relatively remote ob-
jective when we cope with the stark reality of pluralistic tolerance, ex-
emplified by the Supreme Court's Clay decision and by the relegation of
the choosing function to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of our
respective fifty states-each possibly with its own ax to grind.0"'
106. The United States Supreme Court recently discarded its tolerance for plural-
ism among the states in the choice of law to determine the state entitled to escheats and
imposed its own standard on the adversary states. In his opinion Justice Black said:
The 'contacts' test as applied in this field is not really any workable test at all-
it is simply a phrase suggesting that this Court should examine the circumstances
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Mere abrogation of the Klaxon rule would obviously not bring about
complete uniformity nor destroy pluralism in the choice of laws applied
by state courts in non-diversity cases. But it would enable federal courts
to assume a tutorial role to which at least they would seem entitled by
their eminence and their unique position as natural arbiters among the
individual states making up our federation. It may sometimes result in
variances in decisions reached by federal courts in diversity cases and
those reached in non-diversity cases by state courts on the other side of
courthouse square. But for every such variance it will also help to resolve
the variances in choice of law decisions made by federal courts in one
state and decisions under similar facts which federal courts must today
accept in another state.
The men sitting on the federal bench today include many of the
better qualified and more forward looking jurists in our country. It
seems about time they should be brought back into the mainstream of dis-
cussion and rule-making in this area of choice of laws. Their talents
should be used to formulate less partial standards to evaluate the con-
flicting jurisdictional claims of individual states. If the federal courts
did exercise this responsibility the structure of their organization into
eleven circuits under the suzerainty of the Supreme Court would give them
a great advantage over the fifty pluralistic states in the effort to achieve
reasonable uniformity. If the federal courts did succeed in establishing
a relatively high degree of uniformity in this area the force of their ex-
ample could be expected to exert a strong influence on the state courts in
their non-diversity decisions. It may be a virtue that this influence would
be one of persuasion and not compulsion. The state courts would still re-
tain freedom in the area of non-diversity cases. Within this area they
could continue to define their own interests and develop their own policies,
to differ and dissent in matters where they may feel most strongly con-
cerned, and to continue to make their own contribution to the federal-state
and inter-state dialogue. The fact remains, however, that this promising
solution can be attempted only in the event of the demise of the Klaxon
rule, for only then can the federal courts contribute their efforts to this
problem from their unique point of vantage as national and relatively
impartial courts. It is this demise of the Klaxon rule, improbable though
it may be in present prospect, which should be accomplished.
surrounding each particular item of escheatable property on its own peculiar
facts and then try to make a difficult, often quite subjective, decision as to
which State's claim . . . seems stronger than another's. Under such a doctrine
any State likely would easily convince itself . . . that its claim shall be given
priority. (Emphasis added.)
Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 679 (1965).
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